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BRITISH GUIANA—TEST CASE

WHAT happens to our comfortable theories of constitutional advance to self-government when there is no effective desire in a Colony to proceed along the orthodox constitutional path? Are we to leap the time-honoured intermediate stages and allow a territory to proceed straight from an advisory Executive Council and a Legislative Council elected on a narrow franchise to complete internal self-government, or even to total independence with the right of self-determination? To pose the question in this form is to reveal our dependence on our own tradition. No British Government has ever agreed to proceed by such leaps and bounds. We have been habituated in our own history to the gradual extension of responsibility, to the establishment of constitutional conventions which veil and diminish prerogative powers, to freedom broadening down from precedent to precedent. We assume all too easily that other people share the habits of thought derived from our own peculiar experience. There are politicians in Colonies where experience of British rule has not been unhappy who have come to understand and to share in this 'British' approach. If they are able to get results, and thereby to survive the label of 'British stooges' which will inevitably be affixed to them, they will carry their people with them and achieve self-government, as in Barbados or Ceylon. But many colonial leaders have a quite different experience. They live in territories where the mass of the people are sunk in poverty and little or nothing is done for them, where there is social ostracism or an overt colour bar, where the administration derives its political support from a small circle of representatives of vested interests. Many of them have never seen Britain at all, or saw it at its worst before the war; some have spent their student days in America or Ireland and believe in the sacred right of rebellion, others have been influenced by Indian non-co-operation, a very few have imbibed Communist doctrines. Such people do not believe that

the intermediate stages of constitutional development ever will, or are intended to, lead to self-government. Constitutions with 'safeguards' or 'checks and balances' are abhorrent to them. They prefer to go without a constitution, like the Cypriots, or to wreck the one they have, believing it to be fraudulent, as in British Guiana. They do not believe they can use it. 'The checks written into the Waddington Constitution,' Dr. Cheddi Jagan has written in his account of the British Guiana crisis,

'were fundamentally designed to maintain the status quo, to protect the imperialist interests of the British Government with its need for primary products to meet Britain's dollar deficit, and to protect the colony's capitalists and their profits. . . In these conditions we felt it would be impossible to make any significant changes in the structure of economic power in the country. As a Socialist party, we felt that such changes . . . were essential . . .'¹

Opposed to this is the view of the Robertson Commission:

'It is . . . agreed on both sides of the House of Commons that at every stage of constitutional development in the Colonial Territories short of the ultimate grant of full self-government some powers must be reserved to Her Majesty's Government and some restrictions placed upon the elected representatives of the people. *If the leaders of a Colonial territory are not prepared to accept in principle some such limitations the whole basis for progress along the lines of this policy is lacking.*'² (Our italics.)

The Waddington Constitution therefore remains suspended. Although no specific period has been fixed for the duration of the present period of interim government, a maximum limit—December 31, 1957—has been set to the term of the present nominated Legislative Council.³

The Waddington Constitution was the child of

¹ *Forbidden Freedom*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1954, pp. 45 and 46.

² *Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission*, 1954, Cmd. 9274, H.M. Stationery Office, 3s., para. 201.

³ Secretary of State, House of Commons, 2.11.54.

the Labour Party, although it was introduced under Mr. Lyttelton's régime. It was generally regarded here as a progressive constitution, capable of being used as a stepping-stone to self-government, as Dr. Nkrumah used the Coussey Constitution in the Gold Coast. Outside Parliament a few complained that it was dangerous to introduce universal suffrage, an elected Lower House and responsible Ministries all at once, but only the Communists regarded this—as well as all other colonial constitutions—as a mere imperialist device. In British Guiana itself, Dr. Jagan was the only member of the old Legislative Council to oppose it, and even then the People's Progressive Party thought it worth while to fight the elections and to take office. It is clear from the Commission's Report that the new Ministers were not prepared to accept the Constitution as it stood. They refused to regard the Governor and the three *ex-officio* Ministers as legitimate members of the Executive Council. Some policy statements (e.g. Mr. Burnham's statement on dual control of schools) were made without any discussion in Executive Council, and the elected Ministers met alone in their 'Council of People's Ministers'¹ so that they could present a united front when with the officials. The Report gives a detailed account of the tension which inevitably existed within the Government, and concludes (para. 199) that 'the Executive Council had come nowhere near to fulfilling its constitutional rôle.' Readers who wish to apportion blame may turn to pages 3 and 4 for examples of the main issues in dispute in which Dr. Jagan's version is given together with the view of the Commission. Wherever the fault lay, it is clear that British Guiana was not able, like the Gold Coast and most of the West Indian islands, to work its way tranquilly through the difficult period in which elected Ministers and officials are required to formulate and carry out a common policy. Rightly or wrongly, Dr. Jagan does not believe that senior officials are willing to work with elected Ministers:

'Before the election which returned us to office these officials had always been against us; after the election they were not only placed in the Cabinet, but were put in our ministries.'²

This was the rock on which the Constitution foundered. All charges of Communism, arson plots, intimidation and so forth—whether proved or not—are secondary to this.

The fact has to be faced that disbelief in the aims and sincerity of the British Government and the British people is not confined to the P.P.P. It is

a common state of mind in many territories. It is a natural product of imperial rule. If it is sustained, as it has been in British Guiana, British traditional assumptions are unreal and irrelevant. Deadlock is inevitable and Britain is faced with a straight demand for immediate independence. This is the present demand in British Guiana. All observers are satisfied that if an election were fought now the P.P.P. would win again, and its leaders are stated to be still unwilling to accept any intermediate constitutional arrangement. At this point the subsidiary charges of Communism do arise. The Labour Party is committed to a policy of transference of power to states in which the framework of democracy is, as far as possible, already established. If we are convinced that the spirit of democracy is absent, then we shall have to accept the risk that British withdrawal may lead to a totalitarian régime. Such a régime, in South America, might bring foreign intervention, as in Guatemala. Are the people of British Guiana anxious to take these risks?

The present policy of delaying elections is based on the paternalistic view that Britain is responsible for British Guiana. It is argued that the P.P.P. won the last election on a programme of social reform, not on a promise to achieve immediate self-government. Fifty-one per cent. of the voters voted P.P.P., but these constituted only 37 per cent. of the electorate. It is certain that the P.P.P. will fight the next election on self-government, and this issue will have to be faced. It can be argued that it should be faced now, on the lines of the Labour Party Conference decision that dates for self-government should be fixed. The Chairman of the P.P.P., Mr. L. F. S. Burnham, commented on this section of the Party Conference statement:

'I am sceptical when the statement says: "As soon as the development of each territory makes it practicable, arrangements should be made between Governments and responsible leaders of each territory to fix a date for the transfer of power." It seems to me the Labour Party may here again be arrogating to Britain the right to say when a Colonial territory is ripe for self-government.'³

Meanwhile, the P.P.P. has embarked on a policy of non-co-operation.

The Robertson Commission recommends the postponement of elections, to give time for the implementation of development plans. Yet it paints a picture of the economic possibilities of the country which is so pessimistic that it is difficult to believe that either postponement or development can be effective. The Report provided no inspiration for those suffering from poverty and political frustration. At present it seems certain that the deadlock will continue until one side gives in.

¹ Report, paras. 119-120. The Governor found it necessary to 'ask the P.P.P. Ministers to cease referring in official correspondence and in the House of Assembly to the Council of People's Ministers as though it were a body of equal or even of superior constitutional standing to the Executive Council itself.'

³ *Forbidden Freedom*, page 54.

² *Daily Chronicle*, Georgetown, 31.8.54.

We give below extracts (in italics) from 'Forbidden Freedom' and from the Report of the Robertson Commission, on the controversial legislation proposed by the P.P.P.

1. The Undesirable Publications (Prohibition of Importation) (Repeal) Bill

'We passed through the House of Assembly a Bill seeking the repeal of the Undesirable Publications Bill.' (p. 72.)

'The Upper House—the State Council—had already rejected two Bills that had been passed by the House of Assembly. One was the repeal of the Undesirable Publications Ordinance; the other was the repeal of the Rice Farmers' (Security of Tenure) Ordinance, 1945.' (p. 84.)

The Undesirable Publications (Prohibition of Importation) Ordinance was passed in February, 1953, 'enabling the Governor-in-Council to make orders banning the entry into the Colony of subversive literature. No orders were made during the period up to May, 1953, when the P.P.P. Ministers took office.' (Appendix II.)

'... the P.P.P. majority in the Executive Council could quite simply refuse to operate the measure or could decide that it would operate as they wished. Nevertheless the P.P.P. Ministers decided on immediate and formal repeal of the law, and there was no opposition from the official Ministers when the proposal was brought before the Executive Council.' A clause in the Repeal Bill declared invalid a section of the original law which had validated the acts of the Comptroller of Customs in confiscating, on the grounds that it had not been declared to the customs, certain literature brought in by Dr. Jagan before the law was passed. The Attorney-General held that this clause was constitutionally and legally improper, but this was not the view of Mr. Burnham, who is a lawyer. *'The ex-officio Ministers voted for a motion in the Assembly to delete it. They did not vote against the other clauses of the Bill.'* (Para. 162.)

On the second reading in the State Council some members 'indicated their dislike of the Bill's intentions' but said 'they did not propose to vote against the Bill as a whole.' An amendment to delete the controversial clause was agreed to without a division and the Bill passed as amended. When the Bill was returned to the House of Assembly the P.P.P. majority refused to accept the amendment. (Para. 163.)

2. Rice Farmers (Security of Tenure) (Amendment) Bill

See quotation above.

'The 1945 Ordinance ... placed penalties on landlords and tenants who did not observe the rules of good estate management and good husbandry. The penalty imposed on the tenant ... was ejection from his holding. But for a landlord who did not keep drains and trenches clean and free from weeds, and dams free from bush, the penalty was that the tenant could vacate the land! Our amendment sought to empower the Government District Commissioner to give the landlord a specified time to undertake the work he was supposed to do by law. If he refused,

then the work was to be done by the Government officer at Government expense and the cost was to be recovered from the landlord. This Bill was described by Mr. Lionel Luckhoo in the State Council as totalitarian dictatorship, and was rejected. (pp. 73-74.)

The previous legislature regarded the original Ordinance as inadequate, and before the elections had set up a Committee (of which Dr. Jagan was a member) to examine the question of security of tenure for rice farmers. The P.P.P. Ministers wanted immediate amendment owing to drought. They did not await the report of the Committee and did not consult the Rice Producers' Association. By the time the amending Bill came up to the State Council, the drought was over. In Executive Council there was no opposition to the general intention to proceed before the Committee reported, but the *ex-officio* Ministers opposed the Bill, objecting to a clause giving D.C.s authority to decide what work was necessary and to carry it out themselves if it were not done, and also to a provision that the cost of the work should be recoverable from the landlord 'by a procedure known as "parate execution." This swift and drastic procedure, a remnant in British Guiana of the Roman-Dutch system and unknown to English law, is one whereby on a certificate by a public officer that money is due to the Government the Court issues summary execution against the property of the debtor, which may then be sold to discharge the debt.' The Attorney-General spoke against the provision for parate execution in the House of Assembly, but 'the *ex-officio* Ministers voted with the Majority Party for the second reading of the Bill as a whole, and when the sub-clauses to which they had objections came up for discussion during the committee stage they abstained from voting.'

In the State Council the Bill was read a first time and consideration deferred for two days to enable the Rice Producers' Association to make representations. On the second-reading the controversial clauses were heavily criticised and the Bill was rejected by six votes to two. (Paras 164-167.)

3. Trades Disputes (Essential Services) (Repeal) Bill

'We introduced legislation to suspend the Essential Services Act, which was a temporary wartime measure. ...' (P. 75.)

The official Ministers opposed simple repeal in Executive Council. They 'had in mind the need for a measure substantially like that in effect in Great Britain where the workers in specified services such as gas, water, sanitation and so on, are required to give ten days' notice before coming out on strike. ... But we do not see in that evidence of political hostility to the P.P.P. ... The attitude of the official Ministers is to us evidence only of their determination to do their duty as responsible officials and members of the Executive Council. ... The Bill was read a first time in the House of Assembly but no further action was taken on it before the suspension of the Constitution. (Para. 168.)

4. Labour Relations Bill

This Bill was brought forward by the P.P.P. Ministers after a controversy which had raged in the sugar industry since the formation of the Guiana Industrial Workers' Union in 1948. This union has competed with the established union, the Manpower Citizens' Association, for the membership of sugar workers since that date. It has not been recognised as a negotiating body by the employers.¹ According to the Report of the Constitutional Commission, the Sugar Producers' Association offered on August 20 'to consider recognising the G.I.W.U. in addition to the M.P.C.A. on condition that the two Unions would agree to work jointly with each other with the ultimate object of amalgamating the two bodies; that the G.I.W.U. would accept the existing agreements between the Association and the M.P.C.A. for the avoidance and settlement of disputes on wages and working conditions of employment; and would undertake to enter into written agreements on its own account with the Association covering these matters.' A strike was called by the G.I.W.U. on August 31, strike demands being sent to the S.P.A. on September 5, the demands making no mention of recognition. The strike was called off on September 23 and the Labour Relations Bill was introduced in the House of Assembly on the 24th (paras. 178-181 of Report).

'Our Labour Relations Bill did not say that the G.I.W.U. or any specific union should be recognised by the employers. It empowered the Minister of Labour to authorise a poll in any industry in which there was no recognised union or where a dispute existed between two or more unions for recognition as a bargaining agent. In the former case an employer was forced to recognise any union that secured 51 per cent. of the votes at a poll conducted by the Labour Department. But in the latter case where a union was already recognised, the challenging union had to secure at least 65 per cent. of the votes. This went beyond the U.S. National Labour Relations Act which stipulated only a bare majority of 51 per cent.' (p. 51.)

'On the day when British troops entered Guiana we passed in the House of Assembly our Labour Relations Bill. Employers were to be made by law to negotiate with trade unions, and to recognise for collective bargaining only unions enjoying majority support.' (p. 74.)

'We had intimated to the Governor that we wanted him to use his Constitutional power to summon a meeting of both Houses to consider particularly the Labour Relations Bill and the Local Government Bill. Had he refused, as no doubt he would, then we

would have exposed him to the people. If, on the other hand, he had summoned a joint meeting, then automatically the Bills would have gone to him to be signed. For we had a total of 20 out of 36 members—18 out of 27 in the Lower House and 2 out of 9 in the Upper House. But he need not, of course, have given his signature. His absolute veto would then have come into play. In either case, therefore, the Governor would have become a very unpopular figure.' (p. 65.)

'The Government statement says the troops came to British Guiana to forestall a Communist plot on our part to destroy the Constitution and the administration of the colony; but they came really to forestall this imminent exposure of the Governor and the Constitution.' (p. 86.)

The Report records that at 4.30 p.m. on September 14 the Minister of Labour handed a copy of the Bill to the Commissioner of Labour for his comments, and the next day it was brought to the Executive Council for the first time. The Commissioner 'set out his comments and suggestions on various clauses of the Bill which seemed to him to be at variance with certain I.L.O. Conventions and gave them to the Minister in time for the meeting of the Executive Council. In the discussion . . . in the Executive Council the Governor and the *ex-officio* Ministers raised objections to the Bill in principle and made suggestions' for amendment and for an approach to the trade unions and the employers' associations for their views before the Bill was published. The Minister refused this 'on the ground that these organisations would have sufficient opportunity to express their views after the Bill was published.' There was subsequently a dispute over the decisions made at this meeting. The Bill was published on September 19 without further discussion, and was introduced on September 24, the Minister of Labour asking for leave to move a motion to suspend Standing Orders 'to enable the Bill to be taken through all its stages in the Assembly on that same day. The Speaker quite properly refused and after . . . debate the Bill was finally passed by the House of Assembly on October 8. As the Legislature was prorogued the next day the Bill never reached the State Council.' (paras. 182-184.) Objections to the Bill on trade union grounds are listed in para. 185.

'The Speaker held that as the Bill was important and controversial proper time should be allowed the Members, and public opinion outside, to consider its implications. Mr. Burnham challenged his ruling and, when it was maintained, all the P.P.P. Members save one left the Chamber in rowdy protest.' para. 146.)

*'The proceedings of the House of Assembly were normally attended by large and interested audiences. . . . When tension was high in the latter days . . . they clapped the P.P.P. Members and booed the *ex-officio* and Opposition Members. On September 24, when the P.P.P. Members walked out, disorderly and excited mobs swept through the Chamber.'* (para. 147.)

¹ Some of the earlier history of this dispute may be traced in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Shootings on the Enmore Estate in June, 1948, the Report of a Commission of Enquiry into the Sugar Industry of British Guiana (Colonial No. 249, H.M. Stationery Office), and in *Venture*, March, 1951, page 7.

SOUTHERN NIGERIA VOTES

THE victory of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in both Western and Eastern Regions in the federal elections takes Nigeria a step towards unity. By instituting direct election from constituencies to the federal legislature, the London and Lagos Conferences of 1953 and 1954 made a major improvement in the Constitution. Two of the three monolithic party blocs in the House of Representatives, which made impossible the normal interplay of forces and groups within it and imposed a complete rigidity on the central Government, have gone. In the old Government, elected Ministers came from each Region in equal numbers and had no common platform. They were, as the late Chief Bode Thomas pointed out, 'not even a coalition, but an accident of the Constitution.' Now the N.C.N.C. will send in six Ministers, three from the West and three from the East, to sit with the three from the North and the one from the Cameroons who have yet to be elected. On the floor of the House, opposition members, mainly Action Group and United National Independence Party members from both East and West, may find some allies from amongst the Northern and Cameroonian members. Even if they do not, the central House now has the makings of a stable opposition. Until the Northern elections have been held it is futile to guess whether the elected side of the Government will be stable or not. Much will depend on the spirit in which the N.C.N.C. acts. Its principal opponent in the south, the Action Group, has suffered a major defeat despite its excellent record in office in the Western Region. There is no reason why this record should not be continued. The Action Group Government has now at its disposal a regionalised civil service and the control of the regionalised marketing boards, and regional legislation is no longer subject to the sanction of the centre. The desire to strengthen the Regions as against the centre was always strongest in the Action Group, and this has made its appeal as a national party correspondingly weak. If the Central Government confines itself strictly to the limited functions now ascribed to it under the Constitution, there is no reason at all why the West should not be represented in the Region by an Action Group majority and at the Centre by an N.C.N.C. majority. If, on the other hand, the victory is pushed too far, a desire to break away when self-government comes up for discussion in 1956 may be stimulated in the West.

It is to be hoped that the new Constitution will

be more gently handled than its predecessor. It was not necessary, for example, for the three Regional legislatures to send one-party blocs to the centre, although the 1951 Constitution allowed them to do so. Nor was it necessary for the Western Regional House to exclude Dr. Azikiwe from the central House of Representatives although the citizens of Lagos, who elected him to the Regional House, had put him second in the poll. There have been many other occasions in the last two years when leaders in all three Regions acted as though they were responsible to their parties rather than to the country, and this, rather than the exact shape of the machinery, was responsible for the breakdown of the Constitution. If this temper proves to be a thing of the past, and if leaders of all parties act with that flexibility of which they are known to be capable, the new constitution should stand a good chance, and the unity of Nigeria may, in 1956, become a reality.

SETTLEMENT IN UGANDA?

IF the Bugando Lukiko accepts the proposals of the Hancock Committee¹ on reforms in Buganda, if the Kabaka is asked by the Lukiko to return, and is willing to enter into a Solemn Engagement with the Lukiko and with Her Majesty's Government accepting the constitutional arrangements for Buganda and the Uganda Agreement, as amended, he may return to his people. The constitutional arrangements must be well established first, and this places the probable date about a year hence, but the period may be shortened.² The proposals of the Namirembe Conference over which Professor Hancock presided are so far-reaching that they must be dealt with in our January number. They are accompanied by the Governor's proposals to introduce a Ministerial system, with three African Ministers, in the Uganda Government, and at the same time to increase both the number and the proportion of African members in the Legislative Council. If these proposals are accepted, feudalism will be on its way out and Uganda will be indisputably set on its course of development as a primarily African state. Such a settlement would provide a happy ending to the crisis which has shaken Buganda to its roots in the past year. Despite the muddles and misrepresentations which have dogged the footsteps of Sir Andrew Cohen and the Kabaka throughout, the ordeal will have been worth it.

¹ *Uganda Protectorate: Buganda*, Cmd. 9320, H.M. Stationery Office, 1s.

² *Hansard*, House of Commons, 16.11.54.

LABOUR'S COLONIAL POLICY

We print below further extracts from answers to the questionnaire circulated to members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, printed in "Venture" in September, 1954.¹

The third, fourth and fifth questions in the section on economic development were:—

3. Are any changes necessary in the present financial arrangements of the sterling area?

4. Are any changes necessary in the present commercial policy of the United Kingdom—e.g. long-term bulk purchase agreements, trade with Japan, price of British exports?

5. Should a Labour Government encourage investment in the Colonies by British private enterprise? If so, what encouragement should be given? What safeguards should be devised to protect colonial peoples from exploitation?

Question 3.

'Any changes in the financial arrangements of the sterling area should be made primarily in the interests of all its members rather than of a section of them. It is true that by belonging to the sterling area Colonies which are substantial dollar earners forego their freedom to make dollar purchases to the full extent of their earnings. It is doubtful if any great real sacrifice is involved in this; and in any case since their dollar earnings are of great benefit to the British economy, it seems reasonable that they should make this contribution, in view of the financial benefits which they receive from the British connection, e.g. their defence is almost entirely provided for, they receive Colonial Development and Welfare assistance, and they are helped to secure British administrators and technicians. Moreover, their own prosperity is very closely bound up with that of the United Kingdom and the other members of the sterling area.'—(United Kingdom.)

'The present arrangements would appear to benefit the metropolitan country at the expense of capital formation in the colonial territories. Some form of adjustment should be made to prevent too heavy a drain of profits away from the colonial territories.'—(Singapore.)

'There is a case for a tightening up of the controls of capital movements within the area. The present tendency for capital to flow from the under-developed territories of the Commonwealth to the older Dominions is wholly deplorable.'—(United Kingdom.)

'The sterling area is probably a benefit to the Colonies as few could stand on their own financially. It seems wrong that Colonies should build up large sterling balances, and endeavours should be made to reduce these by supplying the Colonies with the goods they want.'—(United Kingdom.)

'No. It is essential that politics should not threaten

the unity of the sterling area, because that would seriously impair its strength and confidence in it. Banking and currency policy must be centrally controlled to be effective. The Treasury experts and the Chancellor of the Exchequer do consult Dominion finance ministers and the Colonial Office to maintain continuity and a policy for the long-term benefit of the area as a whole. This is perhaps one of the chief reasons why we have to put up with South Africa in the Commonwealth?'—(United Kingdom.)

Question 4.

'Bulk purchase of oilseeds having now been given up, long-term agreements remain only for sugar and copra (in the Western Pacific). The ending of the oilseeds (groundnuts and palm produce) contracts means in effect that the risk of loss (or gain) from price changes is shifted from the U.K. Ministry of Food to the (primarily Nigerian) Marketing Boards. This shift seems not unreasonable in connection with the greater degree of political independence now being achieved in West Africa, and the Marketing Boards are financially well able to bear the risk. In the case of sugar the position is somewhat different. The colonial sugar producers are small territories and sugar exports are generally very important for their economies. They are not in a position to take the financial risks of fluctuating prices and a stable sugar price which will give them a reasonable return is much needed by them. The present system of international control over acreage and bulk purchase of quotas from the colonial territories at guaranteed prices works reasonably well and should be maintained in essentials. The case of bulk purchase of copra from Western Pacific territories is somewhat similar, though the quantities and sums involved are naturally much smaller. Colonial territories should be given freedom, as at present, to purchase Japanese goods to the extent that they wish. British exports should clearly be competitive in price with those of other suppliers to colonial territories.'—(United Kingdom.)

'Long-term bulk purchase agreements should be greatly increased in number and in scope. They must of course be freely negotiated with the local people—Government and producers—and not imposed. The Colonies should certainly be free to make trading agreements with other countries which are to their own benefit. It is hardly fair that we make them subsidise our higher standard of living—which we are doing if we confine their trade to our higher-cost production.'—(United Kingdom.)

'Long-term bulk purchase agreements in connection with rubber and tin in Malaya would do much to stabilise the situation if only England were the

¹ See *Venture*, October and November, 1954, for articles by John Hatch and extracts.

main customer. At present there is the price fluctuation which characterises a free market together with an artificial restriction on trade with China. On the other hand, the guaranteed market which bulk purchase would bring with it might benefit the producer only and leave the worker in the same position as before. Moreover, bulk purchase agreements in Malaya would do nothing to solve the main problem, that the economy is too reliant on two commodities only (rubber and tin) both of which react violently to changes in the world situation.'—(Singapore.)

'There is no more reason for not trading with Japan than with Germany. It is true that she presents serious problems, as much or more from her unscrupulous trade practices than from her cheap labour. The latter is a lesser threat than it was pre-war, as labour costs are relatively a smaller item in industrial costing, while she has to pay at least as much for raw materials as other countries. India and Hong Kong, for instance, have a much lower standard of wages and living than Japan. Competition and demand will have a bigger effect than government control on the price of British exports. Some of our export prices are down on two years ago, and apart from subsidies, German prices do not seem to be lower than ours, the difference between British and German wage rates being small.'—(United Kingdom.)

'Other things being equal, the primary principle should be to allow the Colony concerned to sell to the best market and buy from the cheapest market. . . . As to trade with Japan, if it can meet the requirements of the colonial people more cheaply than others, by all means let Japan supply. In practice, it is my opinion that with the emergence of India as an exporting country in a big way, the argument about Japan is now fast becoming academic.'—(Kenya.)

'Trade stability is highly desirable for colonial economic development, and this can be helped by long-term bulk purchase agreements and international commodity agreements. This policy, which the Conservative Government has largely failed to support, should receive strong support from a Labour Government. Where Japan is able to produce articles that the Colonies require cheaply without imposing bad conditions on their workers, trade with Japan is desirable and could result in better working conditions in Japan. I feel that it is also desirable that Japan be admitted to G.A.T.T. The Colonies do not require the same high quality (in many goods) that American and other markets do. Goods should therefore be manufactured accordingly with considerable emphasis laid on keeping prices as low as possible. Many British producers are not prepared to produce to different standards for different markets.'—(United Kingdom.)

'I hesitate to describe what is going on in trade as a policy. I would agree a policy is needed based on long-term agreements. Those countries who wish to advance their economies through some kinds of controls cannot do so without a considerable number of long-term agreements. Similarly, if the ideas of *Challenge to Britain* are to be carried out, and the British economy revised, then trade with Japan can-

not be treated in the way the Lancashire M.P.s did recently.'—(United Kingdom.)

'The long-term purchase agreements should be kept up, and public relations should be improved—e.g. explaining purchases of dollar supplies which appear to be against the interest of colonial producers.'—(Bahamas.)

Question 5

'Investment by British private enterprise in the Colonies should be encouraged, providing land purchase is definitely barred. . . . '—(United Kingdom.)

'Past experience has shown that private investment tends towards exploitation. It would be regarded with suspicion, and this would react on public investment as well as the private investment. No encouragement should therefore be given. When a Colony has progressed to have considerable control of its own affairs and is able to enforce labour laws, etc., and has a strong trade union movement and makes the decision for itself, there seems no harm in private investment, but at such a stage the Colony is ripe for self-government in any case.'—(United Kingdom.)

'If private investment is encouraged, e.g. by favourable terms of taxation, the investor must accept economic partnership with Government, perhaps by having Government nominees on the Board of Directors, or/and by complying with certain specific requirements with regard to training and promotion of local personnel. The essential is recognition that a firm, no more than a nation, can claim sovereignty and exemption from social responsibility. The means of getting this recognition is to mix those who recognise social responsibility with those who do not.'—(Singapore.)

'I think that in the present circumstances of our own mixed economy, we shall have to do so, on one important condition. That is that we pledge ourselves to allow the nationalisation of the concern at any time the Colonial Government or its successors wish to take this step, and to settle the question of compensation domestically by such standards as are customary at the time. (I envisage a material change in our policy with regard to compensation in the not too distant future.)'—(United Kingdom.)

'The best encouragement would be an assurance that both invested capital and immigrant labour have the backing and support of any British political party in maintaining the British way of life in our Colonies. The finer differences of party stratagem as involved in home affairs should not be introduced to confuse African thought in colonial affairs. To talk of safeguards probably needed to protect colonial peoples from exploitation at once suggests a lack of confidence in the British officials and immigrants delegated to carry out the policy of the Home Government. Surely British colonial officials are not lacking in integrity and interest in the full and proper development of their territories? In any event the British Government holds the check reins and direct constructive criticism of particular trends as they arise is surely better than the past methods of infer-

(Continued on page 9)

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The United Nations Negotiating Committee on Extra-Budgetary Funds has published a report on its work in 1953-1954.¹ The Committee assists in raising funds for the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). It reports a 'serious shortfall' in contributions to UNKRA and UNRWA. There has been greater willingness to contribute to

UNICEF and Technical Assistance. The table below shows contributions to the latter fund. It should be noted that Belgium's basic pledge was for \$270,000, which has been paid. Belgium also pledges \$15,500 for each \$1m. of pledges above a total of \$20m., up to a maximum of \$337,500. On this basis Belgium will pay an additional sum of \$67,500. The U.S.S.R.'s pledge was not made until June, 1954. Owing to problems of convertibility of currency, the U.S.S.R.'s contribution, if made in roubles, will have to be spent on the provision of

Contributions to Technical Assistance Fund, 1953-54²

Country	Pledges	Payments	Country	Pledges	Payments
Afghanistan	10,000	10,000	Jordan	2,815	2,815
Argentina	300,000	—	Korea	3,000	3,000
Australia	400,000	400,000	Laos	2,857	2,857
Austria	19,231	9,616	Lebanon	6,846	—
Belgium	337,500	270,000	Liberia	15,000	—
Bolivia	7,895	—	Libya	3,600	3,600
Brazil	540,541	108,054	Luxembourg	2,500	2,500
Burma	12,000	12,000	Mexico	34,682	—
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Re-			Monaco	1,429	1,429
public	50,000	50,000	Netherlands	600,000	600,000
Canada	1,500,000	1,500,000	New Zealand	125,593	125,593
Ceylon	15,000	15,000	Nicaragua	5,000	—
Chile	58,909	—	Norway	97,998	55,999
China [Formosa]	15,000	15,000	Pakistan	166,213	166,213
Colombia	140,000	140,000	Panama	3,000	3,000
Costa Rica	6,000	5,000	Paraguay	8,000	—
Czechoslovakia	69,444	69,444	Peru	12,000	—
Denmark	434,342	283,944	Philippines	55,000	—
Dominican Republic	10,000	—	Poland	75,000	75,000
Ecuador	6,400	205	Saudi Arabia	15,000	15,000
Egypt	86,157	86,157	Sweden	483,279	483,279
El Salvador	6,000	6,000	Switzerland	233,372	175,029
Ethiopia	20,000	—	Syria	11,410	—
Finland	10,000	10,000	Thailand	40,000	40,000
France	1,207,500	1,207,500	Turkey	201,495	201,495
Germany, Federal Republic of ...	148,810	148,810	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re-		
Greece	5,000	5,000	publics	125,000	125,000
Guatemala	7,500	—	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic	1,000,000	—
Haiti	12,000	12,000	United Kingdom	1,820,218	1,820,218
Honduras	8,000	—	United States of America ...	13,861,809	3,904,188
Iceland	2,806	2,806	Uruguay	75,000	—
India	300,000	300,000	Vatican City	2,000	2,000
Indonesia	65,790	59,211	Venezuela	45,000	32,500
Iran	50,000	—	Viet-Nam	7,500	7,500
Iraq	14,002	—	Yemen	2,100	2,100
Ireland	14,001	—	Yugoslavia	82,500	82,500
Israel	50,000	40,000			
Italy	96,000	—			
Japan	80,000	80,000			
			<i>Grand Total</i>	<i>25,252,044</i>	<i>12,778,562</i>

experts and materials provided by the U.S.S.R. Negotiations are proceeding on this problem. The United States pledge \$12,750,000 if the total pledges of other countries reach \$8,500,000 (i.e., on a 60:40 matching basis), with an additional sum, up to a maximum of \$2m., on a 40:60 matching basis for any amounts pledged over \$8,500,000. Congress voted the whole amount of \$13,861,809 in August, to be paid by the end of 1954.

The uncertain budgetary position revealed in the figures has a serious effect on the efficiency of the Technical Assistance organisation, which is unable to plan ahead. A further difficulty is that receiving countries must be willing to receive the experts suggested, and a number of countries have objections to receiving the nationals of some other countries, for their own reasons, which vary.

On October 25, in reply to Mr. Rankin and Mr. Hamilton in the House of Commons, Mr. Turton said that the size of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Technical Assistance Programme for 1955 had not yet been fixed. On the question of maintaining a fixed payment for at least three years he referred to the reply given to Mr. Noel-Baker on March 22, in which it was stated that the Government preferred to continue to deal with the financial commitment on an annual basis. On that occasion Mr. Nutting said that he did not agree that the reluctance of Governments to place their contributions on a forward basis would hamper the programme, and that he understood that the only Government prepared to do this was the Government of Indonesia. Mr. Noel-Baker also enquired whether the Government had given support to the proposal referred to by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 7, 1953, for the establishment of a special U.N. Fund for Economic Development. Mr. Nutting said that the United Kingdom supported the principle of an international fund but did not consider it practicable to take any immediate steps towards its establishment.

On September 17, 1954, the Secretary-General presented to the General Assembly a summary of comments received from Governments on the proposal to set up a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.³

All the Governments which had replied supported the principle of giving economic assistance, but support for a special fund was not unanimous. France could 'only approve the wider application of principles which it itself applies in the under-developed territories under its administration,' and considered 'that the establishment of such a fund is one of the measures which may contribute to the solution of a whole group of problems on which the future of the world economy depends.' Japan thought that such assistance through the U.N. would be most acceptable to the under-developed countries. Bolivia and Honduras supported the principle and stressed their own need of such assistance, and Honduras offered a definite contribution. Belgium thought that

such a fund should be limited to 'basic investment or to social investment complementary to industrial development,' and made its material support conditional on contributions being made by at least 29 other states, which 'should obviously include the principal industrial countries, and in any event the United States.' Norway would make a financial contribution 'as soon as financial support from the great Powers shall make the establishment of the Fund practically feasible.' Canada replied that the resources made available should be additional to those already being channelled to under-developed countries. Australia, China [Formosa], Cuba, the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, replied that they were not at present in a position to contribute. The United States referred to its present commitments, including the burden of defence due to international tension, doubted whether sufficient resources could be raised and thought that existing channels of financing were adequate. In view of these considerations it was 'not now prepared to enter into new multi-lateral commitments.'

Continued from page 7

ence by sections of the Labour Party that the white officials and residents on the spot were not to be trusted in any measure of local control. If any safeguards are considered necessary they should be viewed and devised in the light of danger from within the African community, as well as from without.'—(Kenya.)

'No. Most certainly not. On the contrary one of the first acts of the next Labour Government should be to nationalise the United Africa Company. Private enterprise should be encouraged to invest in self-governing countries such as Burma and Egypt where the need of capital is only matched by the fear of its influence and the risk of investment. That is one of the troubles with a mixed economy; the private sector persists in being motivated by profit, and will never go where it is needed but only where it can command government in its interests.'—(United Kingdom.)

'A Labour Government should encourage investment in the Colonies by private enterprise. Private enterprise attracts better technical skill than the Government, and technical skill is what the Colonies need.'—(United Kingdom.)

'In fact the whole of the investment problem calls into question the control and organisation of investment in Britain, and this is not the place to discuss the methods of financing industry, the provision of risk capital, the fixing of limits of profit and so on, but I would say that the present "system" is so completely inadequate that no solution will come for colonial investment unless it is tackled here. Neither will a Labour Government have much success unless this fundamental aspect of capitalist organisation is dealt with.'—(United Kingdom.)

'There is no frightful hurry to develop at a rate which may defeat the true interests (long term) of the indigenous people.'—(Tanganyika.)

¹General Assembly, A/2730.

²In U.S. dollars.

³General Assembly, A/2727.

Parliament

Multi-racial juries in Kenya. Mr. James Johnson asked when it was the intention of the Colonial Secretary to begin the appointment of multi-racial juries. Mr. Lennox Boyd said that he was consulting the Governor on this matter. (November 10.)

Detention Orders in Kenya. In reply to Mr. Hector Hughes, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that 24,533 detention orders had been made under the Emergency Powers Regulations and 24,206 enforced. 772 detainees had appealed to the advisory committee, which had recommended that one should be released unconditionally and 16 conditionally. That advice had been followed in all but four cases which were still being considered. (November 10.)

Rubber Smallholdings in Malaya. In reply to Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that there were nearly 400,000 smallholdings of an average of under 4½ acres. No estimate of the persons engaged on smallholdings was available. The Rubber Research Institute had for many years operated a smallholders' Advisory Service to provide planting material and technical assistance. In addition the Federal Government had established a scheme, financed from a cess on rubber exports, under which it was intended to replant with high-yielding trees 500,000 acres of smallholders' rubber by the end of 1959. (November 10.)

Social Security Schemes in East and Central Africa. In reply to Mr. Benn, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that social security schemes providing cash benefits did not exist except for a limited old-age pension fund in Northern Rhodesia, but the social services provided by all Governments included free or subsidised medical and hospital services, poor relief from public funds and employment exchanges, except in Nyasaland. Legislation also covered workmen's compensation and the provision of sick benefits by employers. (October 20.)

Doctors in the Colonial Territories. In answer to Mr. Yates, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the total number of doctors, including those who do not hold fully registrable qualifications but are licensed to practise, is approximately 6,000. This represented an average of 12,500 people for each practitioner in the colonial territories as a whole. The Secretary of State also gave figures of approximate estimates in individual territories. These ranged from 500 persons per practitioner in the Falkland Islands to 64,000 in the Somaliland Protectorate. (October 20.)

Nigeria: Federal Elections. In reply to Mr. James Johnson, the Secretary of State said that polling day in the Eastern and Western Regions would be a public holiday. Electoral arrangements were laid down in Regulations made by the Governor-General in Council and provided for the appointment of

electoral officers in each Region; the dates for polling were fixed by the Chief Electoral Officers on the direction of the Regional Governors-in-Council; in the Eastern Region and the Southern Cameroons the periods for applications for inclusion in the list of voters and for lodging claims and objections were fixed by electoral officers in their discretion, the discretionary power enabling periods to be adjusted to suit each electoral district. In the Western Region, the preliminary list of electors must be published at least 28 days before polling day, claims must be lodged within seven days, final lists published 13 days before polling day. In the Northern Region 14 days were allowed for applications for inclusion in the preliminary list, 10 days for claims and seven days for consideration of claims. The Secretary of State gave no parallel information for the Eastern Region or Southern Cameroons. In all Regions constituencies were formed by sub-dividing administrative districts into single-member constituencies according to population, with the exception of 5 two-member constituencies in the Northern Region and 9 two-member and 3 three-member constituencies in the Eastern Region. (November 3.)

West Indian Federation progress. In reply to Sir R. Robinson, the Colonial Secretary said that so far the Federal Plan that had been agreed by the Conference on West Indian Federation last year had been accepted by the Legislatures of Grenada, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and by the Barbados House of Assembly. (October 27.)

Communist Ban in Nigeria. Mr. Dugdale asked whether the decision to ban Communists from certain Government posts was made with his approval. Mr. Lennox Boyd replied that this was a matter within the competence of the Federal and Regional Governments in Nigeria. It was not therefore necessary for them to consult him before they took their decision, and they did not do so. He added that the decision had his unqualified support. (October 27.)

Registration of electors in Singapore. In reply to Mr. Awbery, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that any person was entitled to be registered who:—

(a) was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of the provisions of the British Nationality Act, 1948, or was born in any of the States or territories now included in the Federation of Malaya or in Sarawak, North Borneo or Brunei;

(b) was ordinarily resident in the Colony of Singapore on the 1st day of April in the year of registration; and

(c) was not less than twenty-one years of age on the 1st day of July in that year.

The first election would, it was hoped, be held early in April, 1955. (October 27.)

Guide to Books

The History of the British West Indies

By Sir Alan Burns. (Allen and Unwin, 70s.)

'He who tells the story of the experience of human societies . . . is a historian, whether he is critical or not.' Sir Alan Burns quotes this opinion with approval, and those who expect to find a real attempt at interpreting the kaleidoscopic events which Sir Alan chronicles will be disappointed. This is not the history which taught one of George Lamming's 'Emigrants' why what the great nations have done in the Caribbean might produce a great people—'them West Indians.' But we are all in Sir Alan's debt. No book has attempted to cover the whole ground from Carib to Caribbean Federation, both as a part of European history and as the story of many islands for long separated rather than united by the sea. This is a history mainly of white conquerors and settlers, for 'the much larger Negro population, during the centuries of slavery, had little to do, save indirectly, with the shaping of events.' It concerns the Governor, 'the centre and mainstay of the whole system,' rather than the slave, whose past conditions so much of the present. It is faithful to facts, a painstaking and accurate selection from almost every available authority, and often an enthralling narrative of 'brave deeds, romance, and unpleasant cruelty—the latter unpleasant but essential to the whole picture.' The achievement is the more remarkable in that Sir Alan is not a professional historian, though as a West Indian with service in three Colonies and personal knowledge of them all he is peculiarly fitted to attempt such a vast labour of love.

After two chapters of general description he tells the story of Columbus, of Spanish colonisation, and of the first challenge to the Spanish monopoly. England comes late into the picture but soon occupies much of it, first sharing in the French and Dutch invasion of the Spanish Main, then disputing mastery with France as part of a conflict wider than the West Indies but often decided in them. Chapter X gives a fascinating description of the English Colonies in the early days. Among the many forgotten facts recalled is the request from Barbados in 1652 and from the Leeward Island some 40 years later for representation at Westminster—the French method which some still believe might with advantage be adopted by Britain. One regrets the absence of such general descriptions for later periods—there is nothing comparable until Chapter XXI on the Victorian Age, and even this has no such clear unity of intention as the earlier chapter. For subsequent developments in government, the colonial service, the legislatures, religion and social habits, one has to dig furiously in a mass of detail. But the chronological method which creates this difficulty has also its advantages.

We see in one period after another the effect of European rivalries on the fate of individual Colonies and though at times general trends get lost in localised

detail it is possible to trace both the history of separate islands and the interaction between their stories. The Barbadian, the Trinidadian, the Jamaican can find his story here, as easily as 'the West Indian,' though he is never encouraged in whatever narrow localism might prevent the development of a wider consciousness.

In attempting so great a task it is impossible to avoid some weaknesses. The most obvious is that the last chapter, 'The Twentieth Century,' is a mere catalogue of dates and events—not even grouped under obvious headings such as economic, constitutional, etc. It would be too much to expect a full account of the recent past, but this reversion to Edwards' *Notes on British History* is really of little value. It would be churlish, however, to end on such a note. As one who wrote a short history of the British West Indies from inadequate material I feel entitled to lead the chorus of praise which this book deserves. It will certainly make the task of revising one's knowledge easier. Sir Alan's intention to provide a work for 'the general reader' may not reap the reward it deserves, but it will certainly encourage and help others to produce such a work in more manageable compass. Since these things are too often missing, be it said finally that there are many excellent maps, a very good bibliography and a reliable index. Would that more Governors had the time, patience, and skill to produce other such works.

H. V. Wiseman.

SHORT NOTICES

Missionary Statesmanship in Africa: A Present Day Demand upon the Christian Movement. Proceedings of the Study Conference, May 28-31, 1953, of the Kennedy School of Missions. (Hartford Seminary Foundation, Connecticut, no price given). This symposium touches on many aspects of cultural and political relationships in Africa. Inevitably, after the suppression of the slave trade and tribal wars, nineteenth century missionaries thought of their job in terms of raising an undifferentiated mass of barbarism to Christian civilisation, but in fact a variety of autonomous societies, some highly developed, existed. Our provision of external security and subsequent weakening of tribal sanctions have promoted the growth of individualism to an anti-social degree. The task now is to rebuild African society. Can Christianity adapt itself to the many forms of African society, from the Gold Coast to the Union? Can it be successful in Africa when it appears to be the second-hand cast-off of so many Europeans? Can it be accepted in so many rival forms? The Gospel is revolutionary, but it can act as the social catalyst in peaceful change. While the symposium skirts over the vital issues of miscegenation and birth control, on which the church is patently divided, it

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comes to the same conclusion as most thoughtful books on Africa to-day: that Christianity must be built on the basis of African society and comprehensible to it, and it must practise the social ethic it preaches if it is not to fail in its African task.

A Trust Territory at the Half-Way Point, Somaliland Under Italian Administration. (United Nations Department of Public Informations, 15 cents.) A small illustrated pamphlet giving an optimistic A.B.C. of present developments. The foreword admits that Somaliland is by no means endowed with natural resources; but the pamphlet skates lightly over the problems of changing a nomadic population with no written language or technical skills and a 40% trade deficit into the upholders of a modern, self-supporting democratic state by 1960, and concentrates on the delightful co-operation between Italy and UNO. Somaliland, in

fact, is the perfect testing-ground for the belief that backward peoples can be guided towards autonomy by a benevolent power under international control. This beautiful picture may encourage subscriptions to U.N.A. to roll in but is, alas, not the complete story to be found in the records of the sessions of the Trusteeship Council or in the often violent petitions submitted to it.

The Economics of Under Developed Areas, by Arthur Hazlewood (Geoffrey Cumberledge, Oxford University Press, 6s.) An annotated reading list of books, articles and official publications, published for the Institute of Colonial Studies, Oxford. This exhaustive list is mainly for those interested in the economic (as opposed to the social and anthropological) aspects of the under developed areas. It includes references to American and other foreign studies of the subject.

CORRESPONDENCE

Sir,—May I draw attention to an inference in the British Guiana Report that is not, I hope, too fundamental for consideration by the Colonial Bureau. I do not refer to the inference that there shall be no self-government until the Guianese are prepared to treat foreign capital with the same deference as its owners do.

In our thinking on colonial policy we have always tacitly assumed that Colonies must become economically self-contained (*i.e.* be able to balance their external and internal accounts without donations from outside) when they become self-governing or shortly afterwards. An explicit example of this line of thought was contained in an official report of the Labour Government period on one of the East African territories, which stated that social expenditure (on education, medicine, etc.) must not be undertaken on a scale that could not be met from the territory's own resources within a reasonably short time.

The British Guiana Report implies that there is so little to develop in that country that any increase in living standards from internal resources is very unlikely. If this is so, even the very greatest effect of socialist reorganisation (the total abolition of foreign exploitation and the justest possible distribution of internal income) would leave the people of the terri-

tory desperately and increasingly poor by any reasonable standards.

I dismiss emigration as being, for a number of good reasons, a solution of centuries rather than decades. This leaves us faced with two extremes of possible policy:—

1. To withhold self-government as the price of subsidies.
2. To grant subsidies in a form that will leave self-government a reality rather than a myth, *i.e.* as unconditional gifts.

Between these two extremes lie any number of gradations of conditional gifts, but let us be quite clear that such conditions all constitute limitations on the sovereignty supposedly granted with the grant of self-government.

Whether the British Guiana Report is right or wrong about the economic resources of that country, it seems certain that experience will reveal many parts of the 'under-developed' world where such conditions will arise. When the situations arise in practice we must make up our minds, free from any preconceived fallacies about the reality of formal self-government, as to which of the extremes—or where between them—we will take up our stand, and why.

Yours faithfully,

Lydney, Glos.

H. E. Casteus.

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